Questions & Answers
This page provides an online forum to discuss military history and foreign policy. You can use the form on the right to send me questions on foreign policy or military matters, past and present, that concern you—or write comments of your own. I’ll reply to all questions and comments by email and reproduce and answer those that have general interest.
Cordially yours,
Bevin Alexander
Answers
Below are answers to military and foreign policy questions of general interest. Use the form on the right to submit your own questions or comments. Bevin will reply to your questions and comments by email.
- Barbarossa, German Generals, and the American Civil War
- Would the U.S. have used the A-bomb against Germany?
- Sonshi.com Interview
- All's fair in war
- Historical opinion influenced by hindsight?
- Could an invasion of Britain have succeeded in 1940?
- Were intercepts crucial to Rommel’s success in Africa?
- Can terrorists operate like true guerrillas?
Barbarossa, German Generals, and the American Civil War
Q. Dear Bevin: Evan Mawdsley in his well researched book "Thunder in the East" (Hodder Arnold, 2005) has written that "Hitler's pause at Smolensk, his transfer of forces to the flanks, were the result of several factors. But they all come back to the essence of the Barbarossa fallacy—that the Red Army would be destroyed on the frontier."(p. 71.) This is agreement with your own assessment in chapter 8 of "How Hitler Could Have Won WW2". He concludes from this that Hitler's leadership was not a critical factor in the failure of German war aims in Russia, but was due rather to the magnitude of the task they faced, and which was underestimated by both Hitler and his generals.
To what extent would you go along with Mawdsley's assertion that "Even if Manstein or some other field marshal had been given sole command of the eastern theater, it would have made little difference"? (p. 204.) Mawdsley also points out that Hitler's decisions up until the end of 1942 were bold and risky, but after Stalingrad, El Alamein, and the Torch landings in North Africa, he became cautious and indecisive. To what extent therefore, do you think Hitler's subsequent military errors were the result of Germany losing the war and not the cause? Regards Charles Russell.
A. Dear Charles: Very good to hear from you! I am always fascinated with your provocative and incisive questions. Sorry I haven't replied sooner. I'm in the midst of writing a new book on the strategy of the American Civil War, and only just came up for air.
I think Evan Mawdsley is entirely correct that Germany bit off far more than it could chew when it invaded the Soviet Union. I say this in my book. However, I do think Germany could have achieved far more than it did if it had concentrated on a drive to Moscow and not split its forces into three separate, unsupported campaigns (north, center, south). German intelligence had already shown that Stalin had committed a blunder of stupendous proportions by lining up virtually his whole army along the frontier, so all the Germans had to do was to punch through at selected places and swing around the Russian troops and form caldrons. This opened up a fabulous opportunity—one known before June 22, 1941—offering the Germans options as to the overall strategy.
I think this is where Hitler's baleful influence was destructive to Germany's success. The generals around him at the time pressed for emphasis on Moscow, not the other two fronts. If a campaign focused on Moscow had been conducted, the Soviets' northern and southern theaters would have been divided and unable to cooperate. Thus, this would have given Germany on a strategic level the same sort of central position that Napoleon was seeking when he sent Marshal Ney to seize Quatre Bras in 1815—dividing the British army at Brussels from the Prussian army at Namur.
As it was, the caldron battles destroyed so many Soviet forces and the panzers were so successful that, even though only a third of German strength was concentrated on Moscow, the Germans in late summer had an almost clear road to the city. That, of course, is when Hitler in his madness diverted the two panzer groups north and south, thus ending any chance of capturing the city (or winning the war). I also agree with Mawdsley that Hitler was bold until the disaster at Stalingrad.
I separate the Russian campaign from North Africa, however. Hitler was obsessed with Russia, and never saw the war on any grand strategic level. He sent most of his resources to Russia, and never gave Rommel more than token forces. So, although it's true that he did not want to take chances in North Africa, I think the principal reason was that he always saw that theater as a holding action, not as a place where he could reach a decision. There is a fascinating question about the Mediterranean that was raised by Kurt Student, the commander of the paratroops who seized Crete in 1941—that the cost of this operation was so much greater than Hitler had anticipated that he shied away from adventures in the region thereafter. I don't really think this is true. I think Hitler never saw opportunities in the Mediterranean. He told Wilhelm von Thoma in 1940 he could spare only one panzer division for Africa, because all he wanted to do there was keep Mussolini in the war! Regards, Bevin Alexander.
Q. Dear Bevin: Thank you for your insightful reply to my email. I am pleased to hear that you are writing a book on the American Civil War in which it is most interesting to evaluate what effects the varied personalities of the generals—the flair and dash of Lee, the caution of McClellan, or the persistence of Grant—had on events.
With respect to Barbarossa, Mawdsley argues that Liddell Hart's influential analysis, based on talks with German generals after the war, that Hitler made a serious blunder in not pressing ahead with an attack on Moscow in early August, is wrong. He points out that by 30 September when the advance on Moscow began, German Army Group Center had been reinforced by the 4th Panzer Group and the Luftwaffe's 8th Air Corps. Its flanks were no longer threatened, its supply position had greatly improved, panzer divisions had been refitted, and infantry divisions moving on foot were able to catch up with the panzer and motorized divisions. Also the Russians were by then distracted by the Kiev disaster, and were forced to send reserves there, while Timoshenko's Western Army Group had been drained by the second phase of the battle of Smolensk. Magenheimer in "Hitler's War" (Cassell, 1998) who has reached a similar conclusion, writes "it is highly questionable whether there was any chance of success for Colonel General Halder's plan to advance on Moscow in mid-August against a still unbroken enemy, knowing that the northern and southern flanks of Army Group Center were unprotected, and without any strategic reserves." (p. 89.)
It is also noteworthy that Hitler's stand-fast order after the Wehrmacht's defeat in the battle of Moscow in December 1941 saved it from a complete rout. With respect to the Stalingrad blunder, Mawdsley points out that German Army Intelligence falsely assumed, as they had done in 1941 that the Red Army could not launch a serious counter offensive and goes on to say, "Although Hitler is rightly to blame for some of the final decisions, the German High Command especially Halder and Bock - endorsed the early concept of the campaign, and did not begin to worry until the Wehrmacht stalled at Stalingrad. Here Paulus let himself be drawn into street fighting. The German 6th Army was cut up and immobilized. Paulus failed to leave enough of a mobile reserve. When the Soviet breakthrough began on 19 November, he reacted slowly and passively. Above all he compliantly accepted Hitler's orders not to attempt a breakout to the west with his army." (p. 166.)
In the light of all these wrong decisions by German generals and German Army Intelligence, to what extent do you think they were motivated after the war to place all of the blame for failure on Hitler, and mislead war historians like Liddell Hart? Regards, Charles Russell.
A. Dear Charles: Sorry I've taken so long to respond to your message. I've been writing a chapter on the American Civil War (Stonewall Jackson's Shenandoah Valley campaign) and it has wiped out nearly everything else.
Sure, I agree that all of the German generals tried to lay the blame for all of their mistakes on Hitler. That's an occupational hazard. There's a wonderful series of four volumes on the Civil War put out by Century magazine in the 1880s (Battles and Leaders)that solicited the commanders on both sides of the war to write about the campaigns. It is a remarkable source because every one of the generals points out in agonizing detail how he was right and the other guys were wrong. Whatever awful happened was caused by somebody else ’ s mistakes.
My view about Russia in 1941 is that the road to Moscow was open after the caldron battles, and the mistake in not driving on to Moscow was primarily because Hitler diverted panzers north and south. Heinz Guderian (who of course is also protecting his own reputation) in Panzer Leader nevertheless gives a pretty convincing case for this argument. As for the 1942 campaign, I do not blame the German generals for the disaster. True all of them supported the drive. But what destroyed the possibility of success was Hitler ’ s insistence on turning the primary focus and power on Stalingrad instead of the oilfields of the Caucasus. This is what cost him the war. Regards, Bevin Alexander.
Q. Dear Bevin: While it is so, that losing generals tend to blame the other guy for their failures, John Mosier in "The Blitzkrieg Myth" (Perennial 2004) has also noted that the other guy's "success breeds jealousy and hatred. Rommel, whom Montgomery overcame on the battlefield and then proceeded to drive back across North Africa, is scathing in his assessment of his adversary." (p. 164.) According to Mosier's figures Montgomery had over 150,000 infantry and Rommel 100,000 which is less than the 3:1 advantage recommended by theorists for mounting a direct frontal attack on a well-defended position, where no flank attack is possible. To add to Montgomery's difficulty, a large proportion of his army was inexperienced in combat. But when things went wrong he was flexible enough to change his tactics during the battle.
While Rommel's criticism of Montgomery is understandable, far less so is the near hysterical abuse heaped on him by British military theorists. Among their many criticisms was that he was dull, unimaginative, systematic, ultra cautious, and above all slow, especially in his pursuit of Rommel's defeated army. A few analysists did concede that Rommel's engineers were masters in the art of delaying tactics using mines and booby traps, that armies suffer exhaustion after the strain of battle, and Eisenhower's forces to the west were in a much better position to obtain supplies and reinforcements. Mosier's explanation for the antipathy towards Montgomery expressed by British military theorists, was because he refused to conform to their theories, particularly those of J.F.C. Fuller. An explanation put forward by others is that, despite the ultimate success of his flanking strategy in Normandy in 1944, his bombast infuriated impatient allied commanders, when he failed to deliver on his unrealistic prediction for the early capture of Caen.
To what extent do you think that the assessment of Montgomery by German generals, British military theorists, and his overbearing manner may have resulted in his being underrated as a general? Regards Charles Russell.
A. Dear Charles: I'm afraid I fall into the category of Montgomery bashers. My main objection to him was that he chose frontal attacks in nearly all cases, that he was obsessed with "tidying up the battlefield" and with assembling overwhelming power before he struck, and that, when he did move, he did so with agonizing slowness. Rommel actually depended on Montgomery's snail-like pace to give him time to disengage in February 1943 and turn on the Americans at Kasserine Pass in Tunisia. I must admit, however, that I was especially turned off by the know-it-all tone in his autobiography. Egos have done in other generals before Montgomery—McClellan's focus on himself and nothing else in the American Civil War contributed much to his downfall. Come to think of it, McClellan had all the bad habits of Montgomery—never wanting to let his forces go until everything was perfect, and a fatal hesitation to move. Yet for all his bad press Montgomery did wonders for the morale and confidence of the British army, and for that the world should be eternally grateful. Regards, Bevin Alexander.
<< Back to topWould the U.S. have used the A-bomb against Germany?
The following is the response of Carey Peck to a dialogue between him and Bevin Alexander over which way the war against Germany might have gone—if Adolf Hitler had taken advantage of his strategic opportunities, and if he had not challenged the United States directly by declaring war shortly after the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. Carey Peck’s conclusion was that the United States would eventually have been drawn into war with Germany, and if so we would have used nuclear weapons against them.
Dear Bevin: It was remarkable and gratifying to receive your response. Thank you.
I agree the German attack on Russia fatally weakened their overall effort, as did their declaration of war against us. Empires usually fall due to a suicidal foreign policy. That is Toynbee's judgment. The Third Reich followed the pattern. The historical question is, then, would Hitler have declared war against the U.S. in any case? This goes into psychology and national Zeitgeist, but Germany's history and actions suggest yes.
You are right that it would have been difficult for the U.S. to pull the atomic trigger against a European state—even Hitler's Reich. There is an element of culture here, and also perhaps racism. Nobody really knew Hiroshima and Nagasaki so nobody really cared. They were targets. Kyoto, a city renowned for its temples, was spared—an exemption made easier because it never was a major industrial target. Could we have deployed a nuclear weapon against Berlin or Munich? Well, we were accomplishing the same end through conventional means. The RAF and USAF equaled the effects of an atomic attack in massed raids on Dresden (the most brutal example) and Hamburg. The center of virtually every large German city was laid waste. There is a large hill outside of Berlin called Der Teufelberg which was created by the rubble scraped from the streets and lots of the city and deposited onto what was once a forest. The bones of tens of thousands rest there as well. Each of those death lists equaled Nagasaki. I'd say that was a good start, and suggests that in a closer drawn contest we would have been prepared to hit harder.
Here's my thinking. If Hitler owned the Continent—and I do not think he ever had the cross-Channel logistical or naval heft to mount a successful invasion—but if the war had been even more desperately close-fought, maybe we would have waited. We might have played for time. However, if Hitler was attacking England, especially if he was getting ashore, then all bets would be off. Blood is thicker than any scruple in that regard.
Thank you again for your response. It has made me think about destiny and the workings of history.
Carey Peck
March 2, 2006
Sonshi.com Interview
The following is an interview conducted on January 9, 2006 by Sonshi.com, the largest website for Sun Tzu's The Art of War. Click the link below to read the entire interview which covers military strategy, Sun Tzu, the Civil War, the Korean War, great military leaders, and current foreign affairs.
Sonshi.com: Your expertise is in military strategy. In layman’s language, what exactly is “strategy” to you, and how does it relate to warfare?
Alexander: Strategy is primarily the art of the general, and refers most appropriately to the plan behind a whole campaign or war. The word is drawn from the Greek strategos, which means general. Tactics, on the other hand refers to the methods for winning victories on the battlefield or in close combat.
Read the entire Sonshi interview >> << Back to topAll's fair in war
Q. Dear Bevin: Military theorist Hans Magenheimer has described general Montgomery as an unimaginative, mediocre leader, while Von Runstedt described him as overcautious, habit ridden, and systematic, whose victory at El Alamein was entirely due to his big advantage in men and materiel. Interestingly, they never criticise general Ritchie, who had much in common with Lord Cardigan, who led the charge of the Light Brigade. Montgomery won this famous battle because he applied the cold hard military logic of using maximum force at the point of decision. The implied criticism that he only won because he enjoyed 'unfair' advantage is relevant to a sporting but not surely to a military one. Some English theorists maintain that he should have used more venturesome (read risky) tactics, presumably to have given Rommel a bit more of a sporting chance, like a gallant cricket captain making a sporting declaration. Montgomery never played cricket. What they also overlook is the fact that Rommel enjoyed the counterbalancing advantage of defence over attack, on a location ideally suited to defence, and that the history of combat is full of examples of a weaker force defying the odds, and beating one much more powerful in both men and materiel, due to the skill of the leader. Midway is a good example from WW2. Rommel failed to emulate the feats of many great commanders of the past, Alexander of Greece, King Robert Bruce, Henry V, Wolfe, Clive and many many more, who won against overwhelming odds. The concept of war as a species of sporting contest appears to have reached its peak during the conflict in the Crimea. For example Lord Raglan refused to listen to information from a Russian deserter, the use of which he regarded as unethical and giving 'unfair' advantage. Spying in general was looked upon as devious and despicable. That this kind of attitude still prevailed to some degree in WW2 is revealed in the case of Lord Portal, who scotched a plan by Special Operations Executive (SOE) to ambush a particularly troublesome Luftwaffe bomber crew. Portal's reason was that could not associate himself with 'assassins'. My question to you, Bevin, is to what extent do you think the concept of war as a species of sport, has, and perhaps still does permeate, at a deeper level, the thinking of military theorists? Charles Russell.
A. Dear Charles: I'm always fascinated by your insights! Whenever anyone speaks of fairness in war, I'm reminded of the famous comment of Stonewall Jackson as he was withdrawing south in the Shenandoah Valley campaign in spring 1862.
A Union cavalry regiment broke through the scattered ranks of the Confederate rear guard, and rode hard up the Valley Pike until it struck a Virginia regiment, which had halted to receive the charge with massed volleys. As if they had ridden into a trip wire, the Union horsemen were shattered, saddles emptied, the horses going down screaming. All but one Union rider was killed or captured. That night talking to Stonewall Jackson, a Virginia colonel expressed regret for having to deal so harshly with such gallantry. Jackson replied: “Colonel, why did you say you saw those Federal soldiers fall with regret?” The colonel answered that he admired their valor, and hated to have to slaughter such brave men. Jackson responded: “No, shoot them all. I do not wish them to be brave.”
I have never had much sympathy for the idea of giving the enemy a "sporting chance." I've never complained about Bernard Montgomery's use of overwhelming force. My complaint is that he was insufferably slow and cautious, and that he applied his great force in the most obvious headlong way. This cost the lives of many more soldiers than necessary, and allowed Rommel, for example, to get clean away from El Alamein. Also Rommel was so certain that Montgomery would move with his customary slowness that he confidently turned his back on 8th Army and struck the Americans at Kasserine Pass in Tunisia in early February 1943.
Your comment about Lord Raglan refusing to listen to the information from a Russian deserter in the Crimean War reminds me of Henry L. Stimson, U.S. secretary of state in President Herbert Hoover’s administration (1929-33). Stimson dismantled the State Department's office that broke the codes of foreign radio transmissions on the ground that "gentlemen do not read each other's mail." We are at the moment involved in a huge flap in the United States about something quite the reverse of Stimson's "gentlemanly" attitude: secret tapping of the phone conversations of some Americans by the National Security Agency to locate terrorist plots.
To answer your question, however, I think there is a deep human feeling that fairness is important, that taking advantage is the mark of a cad. This explains why many people see warfare as a sporting event. This attitude, for example, lies at the heart of the contempt regular soldiers have always held for guerrilla warriors. Guerrillas don't fight fair. They sneak up on their enemies. Not sporting. Reminds me of a wonderful comment by a British historian writing about the Japanese invasion of Burma in 1941. He complained that the Japanese didn't come down the roads in the way they should have, but slipped off into the jungles and set up roadblocks in the rear that stopped British soldiers, who quite properly had remained on the roads. His implication was that the British lost because the Japanese unfairly violated the rules of war.
I think the other way. I subscribe to the old adage that all's fair in love and war. I'm at the moment writing a new book on the American Civil War. The Confederate president, Jefferson Davis, insisted that the South's position was only to defend itself against northern aggression. He refused to carry the war to the North, as Stonewall Jackson and several other Confederate generals proposed. That is why the South lost. Not because of greater northern power, but because Davis saw himself as a lofty defender, not as a conqueror.
Regards, Bevin
January 4, 2006
Historical opinion influenced by hindsight?
Q. Dear Bevin: After rereading your outstanding account of the German campaign in Russia, I am now convinced that Hitler's blunders in that campaign were categorically different from those made during the campaign in the west, which as I see it, only came to be called “blunders” with the benefit of hindsight. Hitler's decisions in the conduct of the war in the east exhibited the classic hallmark of the incompetent leader, namely that of refusal even to listen to the advice of, or utilise the superior skills of, anyone below him in military rank. He totally lacked the true humility of really great men. The halt order at Dunkirk on the other hand, can, without the benefit of hindsight, be viewed as a logical military procedure, as to whether the next stage of the campaign was to be a move north, or a move south to central France. The decision has to be seen in view of the fact that the Germans did not even consider the possibility of a sea evacuation. Gort himself had not envisaged it and neither had Churchill. Its success was partly due to the swift decision- making of the British Military Command, in organising a strong defence around Dunkirk during the brief two-day respite of the halt order. Similarly, the blunder of ordering the bombing of London during the Battle of Britain was not due to Hitler's or Göring's incompetence, but rather to that of the German Intelligence Service, who persistently grossly overestimated the number of British fighter planes destroyed during the battle. The bombing of London on September 7 was therefore ordered on the erroneous premise that Fighter Command had already been defeated,and the next logical stage, in the conduct of the air war, was to follow the precepts of Douhet. Do you think, in view of these facts, that the controversy over the Dunkirk halt order and the bombing of London commencing September 7, indicates how difficult it is for opinion not to be influenced by hindsight? Regards, Charles Russell.
A. Dear Charles: I would go further than your conclusion—that opinion is influenced by hindsight—and say that judgments on the spot and at the time are also influenced by a vast number of factors—intelligence reports, personal attitudes, the weather, what mood the boss is in, etc. It's difficult in hindsight to conclude which of these factors were the deciding ones and which were chaff blowing in the wind. We are seeing this element played out in maddening fashion in the U.S. today in the argument over what the intelligence estimates about going into Iraq really said, and who really got to see them. Some congressmen and senators are saying they didn't see all of them. The Bush administration says they could have if they had wanted to. This chaotic argument is after the fact. In the actual midst of all great military endeavors there is a myriad of factors that affect decisions. After the fact we can find any number of statements, reports, or opinions made at the time and we can conclude that these were crucial in determining events. But it's not necessarily so. The national intelligence estimate just prior to our going into Iraq listed the possibility of guerrilla or partisan resistance. It was one statement in a 38-page document. The Bush administration discounted this possibility and the invasion went in. Afterward, the CIA (since it was being hammered for loudly claiming there were weapons of mass destruction when there were none) pointed to this warning in the intelligence estimate as proof that they had predicted an insurgency in Iraq. My conclusion from this, and the conclusion of a lot of other observers here in the U.S., is that the CIA stuck this statement in to cover their tails. It's an old bureaucratic tactic to list all eventualities. It was not by any means the main thrust of the estimate at the time. In light of this contemporary mess about Iraq, and my experience in running down sources for my books, I'm hesitant to seize on any one report, fact, event, or opinion made at the time and conclude that it was the decisive factor that led to an outcome. Accordingly, in regard to the Battle of Britain, I tend to go along with the mainstream view that the Luftwaffe erroneously had concluded that RAF losses were so great in the August 23–September 6 period that a change of focus to London was possible. Yet, as I say in my book, Adolf Hitler's anger at a RAF raid on Berlin seems to have played a major role in this decision. On the other hand, the Luftwaffe probably did not know the true extent of the RAF weakness—one-fourth of the pilots were dead or wounded—and thus did not realize it should have continued its effort to eliminate Fighter Command. Which of these, if any, was the deciding factor? I don't think we can know for certain. We see the past through a glass darkly.
Regards, Bevin
December 12, 2005
Could an invasion of Britain have succeeded in 1940?
Q. Dear Bevin: I have just finished reading your book, How Hitler Could Have Won World War II, and found it to be one of the best books on WWII. I would have liked to have read how you would have analyzed the interesting hypothetical question of whether Operation Sea Lion could have succeeded had the Luftwaffe defeated RAF Fighter Command. Heinz Magenheimer in his book, Hitler’s War (Cassell 2002) says no, contrary to the historical consensus. To support his view he quotes Admiral [Karl] Dönitz as follows (page 36): “Even if Germany had managed to achieve clear and incontestable air superiority over large areas of England by mid-September, the invasion would still have remained a risky operation. First, given the advanced time of the year the weather must have played an important role. Second, a mass air assault would have been launched against the invasion fleet not only by the remaining British fighters, but also by bombers. Third, Britain held a trump card in the superior strength of her fleet, which would have been despatched immediately, regardless of risk, against German invasion forces.” This analysis seems to be supported by the complete failure of the invasion flotilla against Crete. Magenheimer goes on to point out that the invasion fleet would have had to contend with mines, shore batteries, and difficulties getting tanks ashore. In addition Britain by September was better prepared than is generally realized with 15 divisions of professional infantry, numerous militias, 3 armoured divisions, and 900 artillery pieces. In view of this, is it possible that the consensus view that Operation Sea Lion would have been a walkover had the Luftwaffe won the Battle of Britain, in fact wrong? Charles Russell.
A. Dear Charles: Your question (and Heinz Magenheimer’s thesis) raise fascinating points. Before addressing the military problems, I think we must wonder whether Hitler was ever truly sincere about invading Britain. If you’ll check my book (page 45), you’ll note that he had already started planning to invade Russiabefore the Battle of Britain was even launched. The evidence is strong that he believed Britain would “come to its senses,” and make peace (in other words, he was clueless as to what motivated the British people—they never would have joined Hitler’s new world order). There’s evidence for Hitler’s misjudgment of the British because he said a number of times that the Soviet Union was Britain’s “continental dagger” (see page 2), and once it was destroyed Britain would give in. This, of course, was nonsense. Churchill was relying on the United States, not the Soviet Union. Having said all this, Hitler still may have launched an invasion if the Luftwaffe had actually gained air superiority over Britain, because he understood the disadvantages of a defiant power in his rear. I agree with Magenheimer that the Royal Navy would have sacrificed itself against any sea armada the Germans launched across the narrow seas, and that this would have caused immense problems for the Germans. But I do not think that Crete proves an invasion of Britain would have failed—quite the contrary. Crete shows the German ability to adjust to unexpected reverses. When the naval strike against Crete failed (at about the same time that the parachute assault also was about to fail because of British resistance), the Germans reinforced the one partially successful portion of their assault (against part of the airfield at Maleme, and heights south of it), and began feeding in troops and equipment by air. I believe an air assault against southern England would have succeeded (provided, of course, the Germans had achieved air superiority), because the British (unlike on Crete) could not predict precisely where a strike would occur, and could not be waiting for it as they were for the Crete invasion. In the air invasion of Holland, for example, the Germans very astutely seized airfields which they then used to bring in an air-landing division + supplies. In Holland they also seized bridges, so the 9 th Panzer Division coming from Germany could reach them, and end resistance. The Germans would probably have exercised the same logic if they had invaded England—this time seizing a southern port and the approaches to it, so any ships that could get in would have a haven. I believe the Germans could have sustained their forces long enough by air in Britain to have gotten in artillery and tanks, and build an ironclad bastion. They most certainly did this in Tunisia in late 1942 after the Allies landed in North Africa, and when they were much weaker relatively than they were in 1940. The distances between Italy-Sicily and Tunisia were greater than the distances between the Continent and England. The critical and most difficult problem in any invasion, of course, was to get enough heavy weapons to England to stop British tanks. The 50mm German antitank gun could have been ferried by air. (The infantry Panzerfaust antitank rocket launcher had not been developed in 1940). But the 50mm gun could not stop the Matildas. The primary task for the Germans, therefore, was to ferry in by ship or barge enough 88mm antiaircraft guns (the best tank killers) to blunt any British armored thrust. Yes, it would have been one whale of a fight! But the story of Tunisia in somewhat parallel circumstances makes me believe they could have pulled it off. I’d love to hear your comments.
Regards, Bevin
November 8, 2005
Were intercepts crucial to Rommel’s success in Africa?
Q. Dear Bevin: I read the part in your book [How Wars Are Won] discussing Rommel and his use of the center position in Tunisia. This made me think of a book I had recently read about codes and ciphers, Secret Warfare by Bruce Norman. In it, Mr. Norman demonstrates that Rommel had extremely good intelligence. For a year, Sept. 1941 to Autumn 1942, Rommel’s intelligence people, with the aid of a stolen codebook, were able to translate every message from the Allies. The author states, “Without it (the intelligence), it is doubtful whether he, the Desert Fox, the man always uncannily in the right place at the right time, would ever have gained his phenomenal reputation. “ I’d be interested to hear your comments on how the impact of this intelligence affects your perception of Rommel’s abilities. Sincerely, Anthony Priest
A. Dear Anthony: Thanks for your message. I've not read Bruce Norman's book, but I know a little about Rommel's intelligence service and that it contributed greatly to his operations. I don't think it was the deciding factor, however. The situation in Libya-Egypt in 1941-1942 was plainly evident to Rommel—that is, a flank on the desert south that could always be turned by armor + a hesitant, slow-to-move leadership on the British side. The combination meant that Rommel could strike whenever he had finagled a few more guns and tanks from a reluctant Hitler. The story of the War in the Desert is that of an offensive by Rommel whenever he built up a tiny reserve of strength. Intelligence intercepts were of tremendous importance, yes, because they gave a good picture of British plans and activities. But they were not decisive. For example, in the Gazala battles leading up to Alamein in spring and summer of 1942, the boldness of Rommel in the face of known British dispositions is what makes this such a fascinating campaign. In other words, Rommel characteristically knew what he was facing (either because of intercepts or from the pure logic of what the British usually did and what they had to do). Rommel then struck hard and with extreme audacity at the weakest point he could locate. To illustrate, in the initial stages of this campaign, when he rounded the southernmost British bastion at Bir Hacheim, and then struck northeast, Rommel may or may not have known from intercepts that the British armor was spread all over the map—but he could have deduced this would be the case on the evidence of previous British actions. You might be interested in reading Chapter 13 in my book, How Hitler Could Have Won World War II (New York: Crown, 2000), which covers this campaign. I hope this will be of some help to you.
Regards, Bevin
November 2, 2005
Can terrorists operate like true guerrillas?
Q. Dear Bevin: We discussed why you think terrorists are not able to be as successful as guerrillas; but what happens when they collaborate with guerrillas? Are they then able to "swim like fish in a pond"? In other words do the guerrillas provide the terrorists with the ability to blend in among the masses? Lastly, in light of your distinction between the two groups, why would guerrillas partner with terrorists if the aims of the terrorist are "irrational" or "unobtainable"? Cedric Muhammad.
A. Dear Cedric: The question, first, of whether terrorists can swim with guerrillas inside the water of the people. Answer, only if and so long as they reflect the goals of the guerrillas themselves. But in Iraq there is a substantial union of purpose between the al Qaeda terrorists and the guerrillas. The guerrillas are trying to prevent a stable successor government being established in Iraq. The terrorists want to harm Americans in any way they can. Thus the two have a common purpose. The guerrilla movement is largely limited to the Sunni triangle (Baghdad-Falluja-Tikrit), and within this area there are enough Sunni supporters of Saddam Hussein that individuals can emerge from the population, do their damage, then slip back into the population with some assurance of safety. But you must keep in mind that the ultimate aims of al Qaeda terrorists and Saddam Sunnis are different, and the terrorists' support base accordingly is fragile. Of course, it is much stronger in the Sunni triangle than it is in, say, New York City! That's why, in my opinion, the terrorists are going to Baghdad. They can strike at Americans and they can be reasonably protected…The guerrillas want to drive out the Americans and prevent an Iraqi government that would reject Sunni (or Baathist) control of the country. Thus the aims of the terrorists in Iraq are not "irrational" to the guerrillas. This juncture of the goals of both groups causes me to believe that there is little to distinguish terrorists and guerrillas at the moment in Iraq. The situation is similar, but not identical, to the situation in Afghanistan prior to 9/11. In Afghanistan, the aim of the Taliban to take over and reorder the country in their own image was supported by al Qaeda, since both pushed extreme fundamentalist goals. Therefore, the Taliban supported al Qaeda and vice versa. In Iraq the Baathists are secular Muslims, and will endure the al Qaeda terrorists only so long as they can use them to drive out the Americans. If that ever happened (and I do not believe it will), then the Baathists would make short work of the terrorists. Hope this answers your question.
Regards, Bevin
November 2, 2005